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ABSTRACT
This paper applies a virtue epistemology approach to using the Internet, 
as to improve our information-seeking behaviours. Virtue epistemology 
focusses on the cognitive character of agents and is less concerned with the 
nature of truth and epistemic justification as compared to traditional analytic 
epistemology. Due to this focus on cognitive character and agency, it is a 
fruitful but underexplored approach to using the Internet in an epistemically 
desirable way. Thus, the central question in this paper is: How to use the 
Internet in an epistemically virtuous way? Using the work of Jason Baehr, it 
starts by outlining nine intellectual or epistemic virtues: curiosity, intellectual 
autonomy, intellectual humility, attentiveness, intellectual carefulness, 
intellectual thoroughness, open-mindedness, intellectual courage and 
intellectual tenacity. It then explores how we should deploy these virtues 
and avoid the corresponding vices when interacting with the Internet, 
particularly search engines. Whilst an epistemically virtuous use of the 
Internet will not guarantee that one will acquire true beliefs, understanding 
or even knowledge, it will strongly improve one’s information-seeking 
behaviours. The paper ends with arguing that teaching and assessing online 
intellectual virtues should be part of school and university curricula, perhaps 
embedded in critical thinking courses, or even better, as individual units.
1. Introduction
The Internet is an important epistemic source. Our information-seeking behaviours often involve 
Internet applications such as search engines, blogs, social media, online encyclopaedia, maps and 
databases. This has changed the way we access and consume information, deeply transforming the way 
we think, act and remember (Smart, Heersmink, and R. Clowes 2017b). The Internet generally provides 
its users with more epistemic benefits than drawbacks (Heersmink 2016; Smart, Clowes, and Heersmink 
2017a); however, unreflexively using Internet-based sources poses epistemic risks for information-seek-
ing and knowledge acquisition. For example, critics point out that search engines may prioritise false or 
misleading information in search results (Lynch 2016), generate filter bubbles and lead to confirmation 
bias due to personalised ranking of search results (Simpson 2012; Miller and Record 2013), and some-
times suggest autocompleted search terms that may nudge one towards a wrong path of enquiry (Miller 
and Record 2016). Also, information on blogs, social media and Internet forums is sometimes posted 
by anonymous non-experts, which makes it hard to verify the validity of the source.1 Some of these 
issues remain open questions and can be circumvented, but they do imply that we should be cautious 
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with unreflexively using search engines and the Internet. Given these possible epistemic drawbacks, an 
important question to ask is: How to use the Internet in an epistemically virtuous way? I shall answer 
this question using a virtue epistemology approach. Focussing on an agent’s cognitive character and 
agency, it is a fruitful but underexplored approach to using the Internet in an epistemically desirable 
way (but see e.g. Choo 2016).
This paper has the following structure. I first outline virtue epistemology, particularly virtue responsi-
bilism, and the notions of intellectual virtues and vices. I then present some of the Internet’s functional 
and informational properties, and briefly survey the recent debate on Internet epistemology with a focus 
on search engines. Having a basic grasp of the notion of intellectual virtue and some of the epistemic 
properties of the Internet, I examine which intellectual virtues we should cultivate and deploy when 
epistemically interacting with the Internet, particularly search engines. I end this paper by arguing that 
we should teach online intellectual virtues (or Internet literacy skills) to our students. We should also 
change our assessment regimes as to allow students, at least in some cases, access to the Internet when 
making their exams. It is important that we change our educational policies because the Internet literacy 
skills of most people (in both Western and non-Western cultures) are underdeveloped (van Deursen 
and van Dijk 2010), which has detrimental consequences for our information-seeking behaviours.
2. Virtue Epistemology
2.1. Introduction
Virtue epistemology is a set of approaches in contemporary epistemology, giving epistemic or intel-
lectual virtues a central role (Battaly 2008). Two species can be identified: virtue responsibilism and 
virtue reliabilism. The difference between these species concerns the way they characterise the nature 
of intellectual virtue. Virtue responsibilism characterises intellectual virtues as acquired or learned 
cognitive character traits such as curiosity, intellectual autonomy and open-mindedness. These have 
been referred to as trait-virtues. Virtue reliabilism, by contrast, characterises intellectual virtues as more 
or less stable cognitive faculties such as vision, introspection and memory. These have been referred 
to as faculty-virtues (Greco and Turri 2011). Given that this paper is about an epistemically virtuous 
use of the Internet, the focus will be on virtue responsibilism, as learned intellectual character traits 
(such as, for example, intellectual autonomy) seem more relevant when interacting with the online 
world. This is so, partly because they are more malleable and open to education. I am not implying 
that faculty-virtues are not relevant when using the Internet. Vision and memory, for example, are 
clearly important when using the Internet for epistemic purposes (see Michaelian and Arango-Muñoz 
forthcoming for an analysis of reliabilist virtues in relation to technology). The goal of this paper is not 
to enter the debate between virtue reliabilism and responsibilism nor to prioritise one over another. 
Rather, its goal is more practical, that is, to explore and conceptualise the value of certain intellectual 
virtues when interacting with the online world.
Virtue epistemology is less concerned with the nature of truth and more concerned with the cog-
nitive character of agents. Compared to traditional analytic epistemology, ‘virtue epistemology takes 
intellectual virtues and vices – types of agent-evaluation – to be more fundamental than justification, 
knowledge, or any other type of belief-evaluation’ (Battaly 2008, 640). Virtue epistemology is thus 
agent-based, rather than belief-based. In her book, Virtues of the Mind, Zagzebski (1996) claims that 
knowledge and justified belief result from being intellectually virtuous. She writes: ‘knowledge is a state 
of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue’ (Zagzebski 1996, 270). Thus, on 
her view, if an agent is intellectually virtuous, then knowledge will automatically follow from the agent’s 
cognitive acts. My view is that this will clearly increase the likelihood of knowledge acquisition, but will 
not guarantee it. Even an intellectually virtuous agent will sometimes obtain false beliefs.
Essentially, virtue epistemology is about improving one’s cognitive skills, rather than the nature 
of truth or justification. Virtue epistemology is thus normative; it is concerned not so much with how 
we think but with how we should think. Its goal is stipulating and promoting how to think well. In 
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SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY  3
comparison, the goal of virtue ethics is to provide a framework for living an ethically virtuous life. 
Likewise, the goal of virtue epistemology is to provide a framework for living an epistemically or intel-
lectually virtuous life. For this reason, some virtue epistemologists focus on education (e.g. Baehr 2013, 
2015a; Pritchard 2013; Battaly 2016), as we must learn how to become intellectually virtuous and flourish 
as thinkers. We must also learn how to use the Internet in an epistemically responsible way and so it 
seems a natural fit to apply a virtue epistemology approach to Internet use.
Before discussing several intellectual virtues of the responsibilist stripe, it is helpful to get some clarity 
on their nature. Baehr (2015b) outlines four dimensions of intellectual virtues: a motivational dimension, 
an affective dimension, a competence dimension and a judgement dimension. First, an agent must be 
intrinsically motivated to achieve some epistemic goal such as knowledge, truth or understanding. If 
an agent is thorough and rigorous only to impress her peers or to avoid losing her job, then the agent 
in question is not virtuous in the relevant sense. An agent must thus be motivated to achieve an epis-
temic goal for its own sake. Second, when pursuing one’s epistemic goals, an intellectually virtuous 
agent experiences some level of pleasure, fulfilment or even excitement. Conversely, an intellectually 
virtuous inquirer may feel regret when he or she has made a mistake. An intellectually humble agent, 
for example, will acknowledge the mistake and may feel regret or some discomfort. Third, an agent 
must be cognitively competent in achieving one’s epistemic goals, which often requires training and 
practice. As Baehr points out, an open-minded agent will set aside a default cognitive standpoint in 
order to take up an alternative one, an attentive agent will notice and attend to important details, a 
curious agent will ask thoughtful and insightful questions. Finally, an intellectually virtuous agent has 
an awareness of which virtues should be used in which situation. Understanding how one achieves 
one’s epistemic goals requires judgement on part of the cognizer.
2.2. Intellectual Virtues
Intellectual virtues are cognitive character traits that are truth-conducive and minimalise error. In his 
book, Cultivating Good Minds, Baehr (2015a, but see also his 2011) provides an elaborate analysis of nine 
intellectual virtues. He groups them in three helpful and intuitive categories. First, virtues required for 
getting the learning process of the ground: curiosity, intellectual autonomy and intellectual humility. 
Second, virtues required for keeping the learning process on the right track: attentiveness, intellec-
tual carefulness and intellectual thoroughness. Third, virtues for overcoming obstacles to productive 
learning: open-mindedness, intellectual courage and intellectual tenacity. Below I provide a concise 
overview of these virtues.
(1)  Curiosity: Curious people want to explore and broaden their epistemic horizons. Someone 
who is curious is intrinsically motivated to learn new knowledge. A curious person is disposed 
to wonder and to ask why things are the way they are. He or she is genuinely motivated to get 
a deeper understanding of a certain topic, concept or event, not because of some extrinsic 
reason, but because of a ‘love’ of knowledge (see also Roberts and Wood 2007).
(2)  Intellectual autonomy: This virtue can be characterised as a willingness and ability to think 
for oneself. Someone who is intellectually autonomous is cognitively capable and does not 
depend (a lot) on others for acquiring her beliefs. Such agents further have a healthy dose of 
scepticism and when faced with disagreement do not immediately capitulate by changing their 
mind. This, of course, does not mean that one is stubborn; one should also be realistic about 
one’s cognitive skills and accept authority and experts when appropriate.
(3)  Intellectual humility: This virtue is about admitting and being aware of one’s cognitive limi-
tations, weaknesses and mistakes. An intellectually humble person is aware of what he does 
not know, of which of his reasoning skills need improvement and of the kinds of reasoning 
mistakes to which he is prone. In such cases, he is realistic about intellectual and knowledge 
domains that are not his strengths.
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(4)  Attentiveness: People who are attentive pay close attention and focus on the task at hand. An 
attentive person has a sustained focus when performing some cognitive task, say, writing an 
essay or reading a text. He or she has a sustained attention to important details, and processes 
these details in an adequate way. Baehr points out that attentiveness is one way in which 
curiosity is sustained and applied.
(5)  Intellectual carefulness: This virtue is about avoiding intellectual errors or mistakes, including 
false beliefs and ignorance. Note that there is a distinction between acquiring true beliefs 
and avoiding false beliefs. To be able to avoid mistakes, one needs to know what a mistake 
is and have a sensitivity of in which situations common mistakes are made. A grasp of basic 
logic and critical thinking skills, as these relate to specific knowledge domains, are necessary 
to avoid mistakes.
(6)  Intellectual thoroughness: An intellectually thorough person is disposed to probe for deeper 
meaning and understanding. Such a person will not be satisfied with a superficial or cursory 
accounts of things. He or she will keep thinking about a particular topic or concept until s/
he has a firm grasp and understanding of it. An intellectually thorough person aims for an 
explanation of the phenomenon in question, and does not just accept some statement. She 
will not be satisfied with merely memorising a set of isolated statements but wants to be able 
to draw connections between different units of information.
(7)  Open-mindedness: An open-minded person is willing to consider alternative views, and if these 
seem more accurate or well founded, then she is willing to change and revise her initial beliefs. 
This is epistemically beneficial because it allows us to form the best, most reasonable and most 
accurate beliefs we can. Of course, this doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t have firm beliefs, only 
that if there are better views and beliefs available, we should be open to change our own views. 
Ideally, we have an awareness of which domains of knowledge we are knowledgeable about 
and of which domains we are less knowledgeable about. We should be more open to change 
our views in domains that are not our strengths, as compared to domains that are our strengths.
(8)  Intellectual courage: Baehr describes this virtue as subjecting ourselves to a potential loss or 
harm in the context of a distinctively intellectual pursuit like learning or inquiring after the 
truth. For instance, it takes intellectual courage when someone contributes to a class discussion 
when that person is not completely sure of her contribution and may feel some embarrassment 
if she is indeed wrong. A key example in the history of science is the publication of Galileo 
Galilei’s book, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, when he knew there could be 
repercussions from the church.
(9)  Intellectual tenacity: The final virtue can be described as persistence or perseverance. Someone 
who is intellectually tenacious doesn’t give up quickly when he doesn’t understand something. 
He is also not easily deterred by initial failure in his inquires. Even when an inquiry is challeng-
ing, he keeps pursuing his epistemic goals. Typically, a person who is genuinely curious about 
some topic, will persist until he has achieved his epistemic goal.
What all these virtues have in common is that they are character traits that a person who desires 
truth and understanding would want to have. My view is that there is some overlap in these intellectual 
virtues, and depending on the epistemic situation, some of these may be more important than others. 
Also, other virtue theorists (e.g. Roberts and Wood 2007) have proposed (slightly) different intellectual 
virtues and so Baehr’s list is not meant to be exhaustive. It does, however, provide a solid starting point 
for exploring how we should use the Internet in an intellectually virtuous way.
2.3. Intellectual Vices
Intellectual vices are cognitive character traits that are not truth-conducive and do not minimalise error. 
As Aristotle points out in the Nicomachean Ethics, there is a vice associated with each moral virtue. 
The same is true for intellectual virtues. There is thus a vice for every virtue outlined above, which are 
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SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY  5
opposites of virtues. So, the opposite of curiosity is intellectual apathy, the opposite of autonomy is 
dependence, the opposite of humility is arrogance, the opposite of attentiveness is neglect or inatten-
tion, the opposite of carefulness is carelessness, the opposite of open-mindedness is being dogmatic, 
the opposite of intellectual courage is intellectual conformity and the opposite of intellectual tenacity 
is indecisiveness. To be a bit more precise, a virtue is a mean between two vices. Open-mindedness, 
for example, lies in the mean of the vices of dogmatism and naivety. A dogmatic person will consider 
too few alternatives and ignore too many, a naïve person will consider too many and ignore too few 
(Battaly 2016). An open-minded person will consider the right number of alternatives.
3. Internet Epistemology
Before I look at some intellectual virtues and vices in relation to the Internet, it is helpful to have a 
basic grasp of the Internet and some of its functional and informational properties. On their website, 
the authoritative WWW Consortium defines the World Wide Web as ‘an information space in which the 
items of interest, referred to as resources, are identified by global identifiers called Uniform Resource 
Identifiers (URI)’. In this paper, I use the term ‘Internet’ as a catch-all term for all the various applications 
that are built on top of the Internet. This includes the Web, which is currently the most popular Internet 
application. From an epistemic perspective, the most salient dimension of the Internet is that it is an 
information space. The information it contains is usually presented on websites, typically containing 
hypertext, but also images and videos, in which hyperlinks are used to navigate between different 
websites. The Web functions as a layer on top of the Internet, which is a system of many interconnected 
computer networks. Thus, the Internet is the physical infrastructure on which the Web runs, so to speak.
In previous work (Heersmink 2016), I argued that ‘in an information society such as ours, having the 
skills to efficiently navigate, evaluate, compare, and synthesise online information are typically more val-
uable than having a lot of facts stored in biological memory’ (Heersmink 2016, 389). In the next section, 
I elaborate on this claim by adopting a virtue epistemology approach. My initial view was developed 
in response to critics such as Carr (2011) and Greenfield (2014) who claim that the Internet makes us 
cognitively and epistemically less competent. Echoing Socrates’s criticism on written language, they 
argue that relying on search engines and online encyclopaedia results in storing fewer facts in our long-
term biological memory. This is epistemically undesirable because it implies that (heavy) Internet users 
know less. My view is that even if using the Internet results in storing fewer facts in biological memory, 
which I don’t think has been empirically established yet (Heersmink 2016), it may be compensated by 
having reliable access to the world’s most extensive and powerful information source. If we know how 
to use the Internet in an epistemically virtuous way, then it seems to me that we gain more than we 
lose in terms of epistemic goods.
Thagard (2001) evaluates the epistemic value of the Internet using Alvin Goldman’s criteria of relia-
bility, power, fecundity, speed and efficiency. Thagard analyses how the Internet contributes to scientific 
research, concluding that the Internet ranks high on all of Goldman’s criteria and therefore positively 
contributes to the generation of scientific knowledge. I agree with Thagard’s approach and conclusion2; 
however, the analysis in this paper is broader and concerns not the generation of scientific knowledge, 
but is more focused on the cognitive properties of agents than of the Internet. My approach is also 
related to but significantly different from Smart’s (forthcoming). Smart analyses the Internet from an 
extended cognition perspective (Clark and Chalmers 1998) and extended knowledge perspective (e.g. 
Palermos and Pritchard 2013), concluding that online information (in some cases) extends our cognitive 
system and may count as extended knowledge.3 Smart’s descriptive analysis is insightful and I am largely 
in agreement with it, but in this paper the focus is more on how we should interact with the Internet, 
not whether it extends our minds or knowledge-based.
Finally, epistemologists have also analysed the relation we have to Internet search engines, pointing 
out two potentially undesirable epistemic consequences: (1) confirmation bias due to personalised 
search results and (2) misleading and inefficient autocompleted search terms. Simpson (2012) has 
evaluated how well Google Search functions as an epistemic tool. He argues that Google Search and 
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other search engines are surrogate experts, playing a rather significant epistemic role. Typically, when 
we do not know the answer to a question or are looking for some piece of information, we turn to 
Google. Most search engines, including Google, personalise search results. Google has a database of 
one’s previously used search terms and visited web pages, resulting in a specific informational profile 
which is unique for each user. Based on that profile, it ranks web pages resulting in a search engine 
results page (SERP).
So when my neighbour and I both Google the phrase ‘social epistemology’, my SERP is different from 
hers, because I have previously searched for related terms such as ‘epistemology’, ‘virtue epistemology’ 
and ‘intellectual virtues’, and visited various web pages related to social epistemology. Web pages I 
visited previously are prioritised over those I haven’t visited and web pages that contain terms I used 
previously are also prioritised. Simpson argues that personalisation undermines objectivity as it creates 
‘filter bubbles’ that result in confirmation bias. Humans are prone to disagree with and scrutinise infor-
mation that goes against our existing beliefs and we tend not to scrutinise information that confirms 
our existing beliefs. Due to personalisation, web pages that fit or are consistent with our existing beliefs 
are prioritised over those that do not.
If one turns off personalisation, the ranking is determined by an algorithm called PageRank. Google 
writes:
PageRank works by counting the number and quality of links to a page to determine a rough estimate of how 
important the website is. The underlying assumption is that more important websites are likely to receive more 
links from other websites.
A web page will rank highly if many other sites link to it. So, its rank is determined in relation to a net-
work of other websites. Note that this does not necessarily mean that a highly ranking website contains 
true or accurate information: just because many hyperlinks point towards a website, is no guarantee 
that it contains epistemically useful information. Also, empirical research using eye-tracking technology 
has shown that college students implicitly trust Google’s ranking in that they prefer to click on links 
in higher positions even when the abstracts are less relevant to the task at hand (Pan et al. 2007). This 
shows that page ranking, like personalisation, can be epistemically undesirable.
Miller and Record (2016) point out that Google’s autocomplete system may, in some cases, lead us 
to the wrong path of enquiry. When typing your search term into Google’s search bar, it suggests (in 
real time) two terms that you have previously used and two terms that other people in your local area 
have used. When you are searching for a term that you have not used before, Google suggests four 
terms that have been used by people in your area. Sometimes this is helpful as it draws attention to 
(popular) search queries that one might have otherwise neglected. In other cases, however, it suggests 
terms that are wrong and misleading and may nudge one into a wrong path of enquiry. For example, 
when I search4 for the term ‘vaccines’ (a term I had not used before, so all four suggestions are based 
on what people in my area have searched for), Google suggests the following phrases ‘vaccines cause 
autism’, ‘vaccines Australia’, ‘vaccines revealed’ and ‘vaccines for Vietnam’. The last three suggestions 
could potentially be helpful, but the first might put a naïve and uninformed user on an epistemically 
detrimental path.
4. Online Intellectual Virtues and Vices
4.1. Internet Literacy Skills
Commenting on Internet access, Duncan Pritchard points out that ‘access to information is of little use 
if one lacks the cognitive skills to interpret this information and sift the accurate information from the 
inaccurate, and the epistemically useful information from the epistemically useless’ (2013, 237). In this 
section, I explore how virtue epistemology can help Internet users to evaluate and determine which 
online information is epistemically useful and epistemically useless.
How would an intellectually virtuous person go about finding the answer to the following question: 
‘What happened to the dinosaurs?’ Many online inquiries start with search engines, typically Google 
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Search. Google’s search engine is an extremely helpful epistemic tool for curious people. But only if 
you know how to use it well, can it satisfy your curiosity and informational needs. Lynch (2016) gives 
an example of how search engines sometimes suggest and prioritise false and misleading information. 
Google Search provides a ‘featured snippet’ at the top of the search results page, when you ask it a ques-
tion. When Lynch searched for ‘What happened to the dinosaurs?’, consider Google’s featured snippet:
The Bible gives us a framework for explaining dinosaurs in terms of thousands of years of history, including the 
mystery of when they lived and what happened to them. Dinosaurs are used more than almost anything else to 
indoctrinate children and adults in the idea of millions of years of earth history. (Lynch 2016, 66)
Due to search engine optimisation, creationists manipulated Google’s algorithms such that information 
on their website was top-ranked for this question. As this example shows, Google’s algorithms can be 
manipulated fairly easily and so we should be cautious with accepting the information in featured 
snippets as true.
As outlined above, Google builds up a personal profile of your informational preferences and filters 
search results based on these preferences. In some cases, this may clearly be helpful; however, it can 
also be epistemically undesirable because it limits users’ attention to important bodies of knowledge 
(Simpson 2012; Miller and Record 2013; but compare Smart and Shadbolt forthcoming). An intellec-
tually open-minded person is willing to consider alternative views, and if these views are more accu-
rate, then she is willing to change her mind. Filter bubbles may reinforce bias and are detrimental to 
open-mindedness and objectivity. Simpson (2012) therefore suggests to turn off personalisation or 
to use a different search engine that doesn’t personalise such as duckduckgo.com. If one does make 
use of personalised search results, an intellectually autonomous agent will interpret Google’s featured 
snippets, page ranking and autocompleted search terms with a healthy dose of scepticism.5 Also, an 
intellectually humble person is not just aware of one’s onboard cognitive limitations, but ideally also of 
the limitations of the epistemic tools she is using, implying that such a person should learn these limits.
It is easy to lose track of one’s initial search query, but an attentive person will remain focussed on 
the task; irrelevant images, hyperlinks and websites will not distract her. This, however, is notoriously 
difficult and requires intellectual discipline and training (see, e.g. Rheingold 2012, Ch 2). As Carr (2011) 
writes: ‘When we go online, we enter an environment that promotes cursory reading, hurried and 
distracted thinking, and superficial learning’ (2011, 115–116). Carr makes a valid point; however, as 
Rheingold points out: ‘Attention processes, like muscles can be strengthened through exercise, resulting 
in measurable changes in brain function’ (2012, 62). Rheingold suggests mindfulness techniques to help 
us become more focussed when interacting with the Internet. As part of metacognitive strategies, one 
can train oneself to recognise distractedness and to force oneself to stay focussed. Another strategy 
to avoid online distraction is to use software programs (such as Cold Turkey Blocker) that block certain 
web pages, for example social media. These programs are highly customisable and allow one to block 
certain web pages at particular times during the day, in that way optimising one’s focus. In such cases, 
attentiveness is offloaded onto a software program.
An intellectually careful person will avoid common mistakes when using Google. Such mistakes 
may include hastiness such as only clicking on the first-ranked page and not reading other pages as 
to be able to compare various sources of information. An intellectually thorough person will probe 
for a deep understanding and will not be satisfied with the first source she encounters. She will keep 
pursuing her enquiry until she has reached a proper level of understanding. This entails consulting and 
cross-checking at least a number of different online sources. It may also entail using different search 
terms such as, for instance, ‘Why did the dinosaurs go extinct?’. Or include Boolean operators, for exam-
ple: ‘dinosaurs + extinct−creationism’ or ‘dinosaurs + extinct + scientific knowledge’.
It takes intellectual courage to search for information in places that are not consistent with one’s sci-
entific, cultural, political or religious views. It is unlikely that a dogmatic creationist will look for objective 
scientific knowledge about evolutionary history on, say, Wikipedia. It is also unlikely that an evolutionary 
biologist or geologist will look for information on creationists websites. There are, however, people who 
are forming their beliefs about these matters and haven’t made up their mind yet. An open-minded and 
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intellectually courageous person will look for information at various online sources and compare and 
judge their likelihood and validity. She will compare various conflicting sources and use her judgement 
and critical thinking skills to draw a conclusion. Finally, sometimes it takes a while when you find the 
answer to your question or query. An intellectually tenacious person will keep searching until she has 
found what she is looking for. The question: ‘What happened to the dinosaurs?’ generates 790,000 
search results.6 It takes some time and patience to sift through and cross-check some of these results.
4.2. Epistemic Responsibility
Code (1987) and Montmarquet (1993) argue that epistemic responsibility is the central intellectual 
virtue; all other intellectual virtues are derived from it. Both authors emphasise the close connection 
between virtue, agency and responsibility. The notion of responsibility is multifaceted when applied 
to the Internet. We have a responsibility to use the Internet in an epistemically virtuous way. Anyone 
who posts information on the Internet has, of course, a responsibility to provide true information, but 
unfortunately there is a lot of inaccurate, outdated or plain false information on the Internet. For this 
reason, we have an epistemic obligation to ourselves, as knowers, to interact with the online world in 
an intellectually virtuous way. Miller and Record (2016) distinguish between epistemic responsibility 
and epistemic practicability. They write:
An epistemically responsible subject does, inasmuch as she can, what is required of her to bring about true and 
rational beliefs. Responsibility is delimited in part by role-expectations. Practicability is delimited by the subject’s 
competencies and her technological, ethical, and economic circumstances. Practicability sets an upper limit on 
responsibility in that a responsible subject need not do more than what is practicable. (2016, p. 3)
So, in practice, what an agent is required to do to obtain true beliefs thus depends on one’s cognitive 
capacities and contextual aspects (see also Green 2017). Given that we all have different cognitive 
capacities and contexts, we also have different degrees of epistemic responsibility. This also applies to 
the Internet, implying that we do not all have the same level of epistemic responsibility.
Simon (2015) develops the notion of distributed responsibility, arguing that responsibility may be 
seen as a system’s property, rather than a property attributed to an individual Internet user. She argues 
that in the online world, agents, groups of agents, governments, companies, technological infrastruc-
tures and algorithms are entangled in such a way that responsibility attributions are sometimes difficult 
to make. Usually these components ‘cannot be understood in separation but only as socio-technical 
compounds … information acquisition and processing involve various hyperconnected agents and 
institutions’ (Simon 2015, 154). In the case of search engines, for example, the SERP is a consequence 
of one’s input, search history and personalisation, Google’s algorithm designed by various engineers, 
search engine optimisation by epistemically malevolent or benevolent actors, and so on. Page ranking 
is thus the result of many human and artefactual systems. Whilst this may be true, I think this provides 
an additional reason for developing one’s online intellectual virtues. An intellectually virtuous person 
will want to take responsibility for knowledge acquisition.
My view, which I have detailed in (Heersmink 2017) is that it is difficult to attribute responsibility 
to distributed systems, in part because it is difficult to hold systems in themselves accountable. This, 
however, does not mean that Google and other search engines have no epistemic responsibility. Google 
clearly also has an epistemic responsibility and there are a number of ways in which it can help its 
users to better understand how the ranking is done, for example by providing a short explanation on 
the SERP about how the results were ranked (based on personalisation or the PageRank algorithm or 
both). They could also provide a visual representation of the inbound and outbound link relationships, 
allowing users to view central and peripheral web pages and trace the connections between web pages 
to determine the interest and relevance of a web page (Pan et al. 2007).
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4.3. Virtues and Selfhood
Lastly, cultivating and improving (online) intellectual virtues is important not just because it is epis-
temically beneficial for one’s information-seeking behaviours, but also because such cognitive virtues 
are an important part of one’s selfhood. Linda Zagzebski points out that ‘A virtue is a deep quality of 
a person, closely identified with her selfhood’ (1996, 104). The subjective experience of our cognitive 
agency and deploying our intellectual virtues is often deeply meaningful to us and largely defines who 
we are as persons (Heersmink 2016). Our identities are deeply tied up with our cognitive skills. Therefore, 
such virtues have instrumental value in that they are for something (that is, being truth-conducive and 
minimalising error), but they also have intrinsic value (that is, they are valuable in themselves; we often 
enjoy utilising our cognitive apparatus for its own sake). As outlined in Section 2, intellectual virtues 
have an affective dimension. Pursuing one’s epistemic goals typically causes some level of pleasure, 
fulfilment and sometimes even excitement. A genuinely curious person often enjoys learning about the 
world and when she uses the Internet to learn some new fact, she feels rewarded. For these reasons, it 
is important that we aim to be intellectually virtuous, as it makes us better thinkers and helps us reach 
our full potential as persons.
Some of the instrumental value of Internet literacy skills are socio-economic. Internet literacy skills 
are a positional good (Hirsch 1977), that is, something that gives an agent a benefit over others that 
lack those skills. In our information society, many jobs (including those in R&D, finance, policy-making, 
communication, journalism and many others) require us to use the Internet. An agent who has well-de-
veloped Internet literacy skills has a clear economic and professional advantage. However, from a dis-
tributive justice point of view, we should ensure that everyone in society has the same Internet literacy 
skills, or at the very least an equal chance to develop such skills. Optimising our information-seeking 
behaviours has instrumental value not just for individuals, but also for organisations and society at 
large (Choo 2016).
5. Education
‘Technological education will be crucial if human-machine cooperation is to enrich and humanise 
rather than restrict and alienate’ (Clark 2003, 183). Given the significant role the Internet plays in our 
cognitive and epistemic practices, it is important that we learn to use it in an epistemically virtuous 
way from the outset. That is to say, schools and universities should include online intellectual virtues in 
their curriculum. Baehr (2013) and Pritchard (2013, 2014) convincingly argue that education should aim 
not just at spoon-feeding students facts, but also at fostering intellectual virtues. Baehr (2015a) already 
is an excellent educational tool to help teach students general intellectual virtues. The analysis in this 
paper extends Baehr’s work as to include online intellectual virtues or Internet literacy skills. In relation 
to the goals of education, Pritchard points out that ‘focussing on the real-world situations that citizens 
encounter – situations that are these day laden with technology – is entirely the right approach for our 
educational policies to take’ (2014, 3). I fully agree with Pritchard here. If many epistemic situations in 
the twenty-first century involve information technology, then we should educate students such that 
they can use information technology in an epistemically beneficial way (Kotzee forthcoming). Heather 
Battaly (2016) suggests that intellectual virtues can be taught as part of undergraduate courses in 
logic or critical thinking. Likewise, universities could (or perhaps should) include Internet literacy skills 
in such courses. Or even better, schools and universities should design courses exclusively devoted to 
Internet literacy skills.
Currently, the Internet literacy skills of most people (in both Western and non-Western cultures) are 
underdeveloped. Based on their empirical work on mapping Internet skills of the Dutch population, 
Alexander van Deursen and Jan van Dijk conclude that their ‘results strengthen the findings that the 
original digital divide of physical Internet access has evolved into a divide that includes differences in 
skills to use the Internet’ (2010, 893). They (2014) also point out that only 28% of the European pop-
ulation learns (some of ) their Internet skills in formal education and 57% by self-study, mainly trial 
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and error, which is much less efficient than formal study. So, there seems to be an important task for 
educators at primary, secondary and tertiary level to teach pupils and students Internet literacy skills. 
Howard Rheingold’s (2012) book, Net smart: How to thrive online, is a useful resource in this regard. It 
gives suggestions for training your attention, evaluating online information, participating in online 
communities such as Wikipedia, and making the best of online collective intelligence such as Amazon’s 
book recommendation system.
A reviewer pointed out that the Internet evolves rapidly and so the epistemic skills needed to interact 
with the Internet in an intellectually virtuous way are time and context-dependent (see also Simpson 
2012). Intellectual virtues that are relevant today may be less relevant in, say, 10 to 20 years. Internet 
literacy (like computer literacy in general) is thus a constant, lifelong process. Partly for this reason, it is 
important to educate students across all educational levels to be intellectually virtuous and independ-
ent, critical thinkers, because these skills will benefit them for the rest of their cognitive lives.
Furthermore, on my view, we should not just teach students Internet literacy skills, we should also 
assess these skills. In Denmark, a pilot study (which was subsequently implemented) was conducted in 
which students were given access to the Internet during their high school and university exams (Knight 
2014). Students in a number of subjects, such as Danish language and mathematics, were given access 
to various Internet websites, but not those that could be used to communicate with other students. Lise 
Petersen, e-learning project coordinator at the University of Southern Denmark, points out that ‘What 
you want to test is problem-solving and analytical skills, and students’ ability to reflect and discuss one 
particular topic. The skill is discerning between relevant and irrelevant information and then putting 
it in context’ (Cunnane 2011). Students obviously are not allowed to plagiarise and so their submitted 
work is automatically checked for plagiarism. The Danish case is very much in line with the virtue 
epistemic approach developed in this paper and should, on my view, be implemented more broadly. 
Note that I am not saying that the Internet should be accessed in all exams. We also need to assess stu-
dent’s ‘knowledge that’ (i.e. their propositional knowledge) and so traditional methods of assessment, 
including written and oral exams, will remain valuable and should be supplemented, not replaced.
Finally, Aristotle argues that moral virtues are learned through formal education, examples and prac-
tice. Battaly points out that the structure of responsibilist virtues is analogues to moral virtues, ‘both sorts 
of virtues are acquired dispositions of appropriate action, motivation, emotion, and perception’ (2016, 
173). Due to their similar structure, intellectual virtues can be acquired in an analogous way as moral 
virtues (Zagzebski 1996). The following three steps from Battaly are helpful: ‘(1) use formal instruction 
to explain the responsibilist virtues; (2) use exemplars to further elucidate individual responsibilist 
virtues; (3) provide opportunities to practice identifying virtuous actions, emotions, and motivations’ 
(Battaly 2016, 174). The analysis in this paper, can be helpful as an exemplar of using the Internet in 
an epistemically virtuous way. This exemplar and various others, together with formal instruction and 
opportunities to practice these skills, are a good starting point for students to develop their Internet 
literacy skills.
6. Conclusion
The Internet is the most extensive and powerful source of information developed in human history, 
deeply transforming our epistemic practices. In order to use it in an epistemically virtuous way, we 
need to cultivate and deploy several intellectual virtues and avoid some vices. Whilst an epistemically 
virtuous use of the Internet will not guarantee that one will acquire true beliefs, understanding or even 
knowledge, it will strongly improve one’s information-seeking behaviours. This is important because 
it makes us better, well-informed thinkers, and because our virtues are essential to our selfhood. For 
these reasons, there is an important role for educators to teach and assess these virtues as part of formal 
school and university curricula, perhaps as part of critical thinking courses. The analysis done in this 
paper can be used as an exemplar in such education.
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Notes
1.  A reviewer helpfully pointed out that there is a body of work in computer science that is concerned with issues of 
provenance (Moreau 2010). The application of such work to the Web may be relevant to future forms of epistemic 
evaluation.
2.  However, as a reviewer pointed out, one potentially undesirable aspect of the Internet for scientific research 
is citation counts. There is a risk that this lead to a rather select group of scientific ideas and findings gaining 
prominence over more unusual or maverick ideas. This may not be to the overall good of the scientific community.
3.  See also, Carter and Gordon (2017) for an analysis of online information in relation to extended mind and extended 
knowledge approaches.
4.  This search was done on 29 June 2017 in Sydney, Australia.
5.  A reviewer pointed out that the real challenge for virtuous Internet-use seems to be knowing who to defer to in 
terms of identifying reliable authority. Indeed, being intellectually autonomous does not mean that one cannot 
ask others for advice. One may, for example, have read something on a medical webpage but still ask one’s doctor 
whether the information is correct and the source reliable.
6.  This search was done on 8 May 2017. A reviewer rightly points out that this figure will vary across time, and given 
that search results are personalised, it may also differ per user.
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